This paper incorporates the process of entrepreneurial …nance into an endogenous growth model with horizontal innovation (Romer, 1990; Jones, 1995b) .
Introduction
The process of innovation in capitalistic economies is fraught with several market frictions and failures. The most commonly known source of failure is the so-called problem of "appropriability", …rst clearly stated by Arrow (1962) . Since a new idea has a non-rivalrous nature, some form of intellectual property rights may be necessary to provide inventors with the right incentives to spend time and resources in the discovery process. A second, and probably less extensively investigated, source of market failure is concerned with the process of …nancing innovation, that is, with the problem for the innovator of gathering enough funds to …nance her entrepreneurial venture. This paper focuses on this second issue.
Both microeconomic theory and empirical evidence have long recognized the potential obstacles hidden in the process of …nancing innovation, suggesting that inventors may be …nancially constrained. 1 Theoretical arguments, proposed to explain …nancial market imperfections in the innovation sector, range from transaction costs and tax advantages to agency costs due to informational asymmetries between the innovator (agent) and the …nancier (principal). While these aspects are common to any …nancing relationship, a number of additional elements suggest that frictions can be even more severe for innovative investments. First, innovations are "unique" events, and the process aimed at producing them is an uncertain and largely unpredictable economic activity (Cozzi and Giordani, 2011) . Secondly, as most of the R&D expenditure is on intangible assets (such as scientists' wages), this expenditure provides bad collateral for the …nancier (Almeida and Campello, 2004) . Finally, a quality-signaling strategy, which could be used to attenuate the problem of asymmetric information between the entrepreneur and the …nancier, is hardly implementable in the market of innovation:
inventors may be reluctant to signal the quality of their own project, as they may reasonably fear that competitors steal their new idea (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983 ).
On the other hand, macroeconomic literature, and in particular endogenous innovationdriven growth theory, usually abstract from the problem of …nancing innovation (see for instance, Romer (1990) , Aghion and Howitt (1992) , Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b) and subsequent developments). In such models, a frictionless …nancial market exists that channels resources from savers to the R&D process, revealing the true value of each innovation. The process of innovation is depicted as a routinized and essentially predictable process. 1 For a thorough review of these issues, refer to Hall and Lerner (2010) .
This paper casts a bridge between these two streams of literature. It develops an endogenous growth model where the …nancing process of innovation is characterized by market frictions, and it analyzes the welfare implications of these frictions. In particular, we construct a scale-free endogenous growth model with horizontal innovation (Romer, 1990 , Grossman and Helpman, 1991b , Jones, 1995a The model studies the occupational choice of economic agents. Agents have to decide whether to work in the …nal good sector or in the "industry of ideas". In this last case, they can choose to devote their time to come up with a new idea, and hence to become entrepreneurs. Alternatively, they may opt for screening and selecting the most valuable ideas deserving …nancial funds, in which case they become capitalists.
We …nd the employment allocation across the three occupational possibilities of this economy along the balanced growth path: manufacturing, entrepreneurial and capitalistic activities. This allocation is found by imposing that, at equilibrium, the expected returns from each of these activities be identical.
We show that the …nancial market for innovation is characterized by a complementary relationship between entrepreneurs and …nanciers, in that the number of entrepreneurs is increasing in the number of …nanciers, and viceversa. The intuition for this result is straightforward: a higher number of …nanciers simply raises the entrepreneur's chance of having her own project being selected and …nanced, and thus it raises the incentive to become entrepreneur, and viceversa. Because of this thick market externality, we cannot exclude the possibility that the economy admits multiple stationary equilibria.
The equilibrium employment allocation is then compared to the optimal allocation obtained through the welfare analysis. The amount of total labor resources that the market allocates to entrepreneurial innovation is sub-optimal and, moreover, it is inef…ciently distributed between entrepreneurs and capitalists. In particular, in addition to the usual externalities associated with the class of horizontal innovation models à la Romer (1990) , our model allows us to evaluate the welfare e¤ects of the search frictions in the market for innovation. As we will clari ‡y in Section 5, the occupational choice of each economic agent a¤ects the payo¤ and the choice of all other agents. In particular, the entry of an entrepreneur stimulates the entry of capitalists ("easy matching e¤ect") and discourages the entry of additional entrepreneurs ("stepping on toes e¤ect"), and a symmetric reasoning applies to the entry of a capitalist. Moroever, the fact that the allocation of the monopoly rents is made according to a Nash bargaining process between entrepreneurs and …nanciers introduces an additional source of frictions: the bargaining power of each agent does not necessarily re ‡ect their marginal productivity in the innovation process. The overall e¤ect on the market of innovation, which is not internalized by either entrepreneurs or capitalists when making their choices, may be positive or negative. As a result, total market-driven innovative e¤orts may be higher or lower than optimal. The existence of these external e¤ects is an additional reason for the policy maker to intervene in the innovation sector.
The modeling strategy that we follow in this paper is meant to capture some salient features of the …nancial market for innovation. In the words of Phelps (2009, p. 50), "the classical supply-and-demand apparatus does not apply to the core market of capitalist economies -the capital market, particularly the market for capital going to entrepreneurs'innovative projects". It takes time and resources for an entrepreneur to …nd and convince a …nancier about the pro…tability of her business venture. At the same time, it takes time and resources for a …nancier to …nd the innovative project that she believes it is worth …nancing. concludes with a few remarks. see Levine, 2005) . In this respect, our speci…c contribution is the one of incorporating the process of entrepreneurial …nance into an otherwise standard endogenous growth model.
Related Literature
Other papers have described entrepreneurial …nance as a search and matching 2 Prior to …nance, search theory has been extensively used in diverse economics …elds, such as labor economics, monetary theory, and the theory of marriage. 3 According to an empirical study by Kortum and Lerner (2000) , one dollar of venture capital generates as much innovation as three dollars of traditional corporate R&D. 
The Model
The economy is composed of three sectors: (i) a …nal good sector, in which the …nal good is produced competitively employing labor and an array of intermediate goods;
( 
The Industry of Ideas
Total population in this economy is denoted by L and is assumed to be growing exponentially at constant rate n (we omit time subscripts for notational simplicity).
Economic agents have to decide whether to work in the industry of ideas or in the …nal good sector. In the …rst case, they can act as entrepreneurs or as capitalists.
Denoting by L E ; L F ; L Y respectively the number of entepreneurs, capitalists and …nal good workers, the labor market clearing condition writes as
An agent devoting her unit of time to innovation comes up with a new idea. However, in order for this raw entrepreneurial idea to become a marketable innovation, the idea needs the support of a capitalist evaluating its potential pro…tability. An innovation is the result of a process of successful search and matching between an entrepreneur and a capitalist. The innovation function -representing the production function of knowledge -is a constant-return-to-scale (CRS) Cobb-Douglas technology:
where A is the (increasing) measure of ideas (incorporated into intermediate input varieties), and 2 R + is a productivity parameter that captures the e¢ ciency of the matching process.
Note that, when a = 1, the model collapses to a standard semi-endogenous growth model (see for instance Jones, 1995b) . Notice also that our results hold for any CRS function. Cipollone and Giordani (2013), however, give an empirical estimate of the innovation process taking place in the Business Angel market of the most developed countries. They show that a CRS Cobb-Douglas technology is among the functional speci…cations that better capture the matching process between the business angels and the entrepreneurs submitting their projects to them. This functional form is also useful for tractability. 4 Given the "matching function" in (1), the arrival rate of ideas (or the instantaneous probability of matching) for entrepreneurs is
4 Two more technical remarks on (1) are in order. First, the hypothesis of zero knowledge spillovers -that is, the idea that the stock of knowledge A does not directly a¤ect the rate of innovation -is only made for simplicity. Secondly, while at …rst glance it may seem odd to admit the necessity of capitalists for innovation and then not to consider capital as an input in the production function of new knowledge, this assumption is only introduced to simplify the analysis and is without loss of generality. We could have assumed a function such as
Capital would be provided by an otherwise perfect …nancial market thanks to the "intercession" of capitalists.
while the one for capitalists is
Let us now analyze the occupational choice of the agents in this economy. If they work in the …nal good sector (to be characterized in the next subsection), they gain a wage rate, denoted by w. If they choose to become entrepreneurs, they gain the chance of a successful matching with a capitalist, denoted by v 0 E . Finally, if they choose to become capitalists, they gain the chance of a successful matching with an entrepreneur, denoted by v 0 F (as we will see, in equilibrium it must be v 0 E = w = v 0 F ). We now use dynamic programming to determine the values of the various states.
The expected payo¤ associated with becoming an entrepreneur is de…ned by the following asset equation:
where r is the rental rate of capital, and v 1 E represents the value of a successful matching for an entrepreneur. This value is de…ned by
where is the fraction of the monopoly pro…ts accruing to the entrepreneur prevailing in the market. These asset equations have the usual interpretations. Equation (2) says that the per period value of choosing to be an entrepreneur must be equal to the probability of a successful matching with a capitalist times the payo¤ associated with this chance, plus the capital gain or loss that may occur over time. An analogous interpretation can be provided for equation (3) . Solving the system in v 0 E and v 1 E , we obtain
The value of v 1 E can then be obtained substituting for the expression of v 0 E given above into the following:
The expected payo¤ associated to becoming a capitalist is instead de…ned by
where v 1 F represents the value of a successful matching for a capitalist, which is given by
where 1 is the fraction of the monopoly pro…ts accruing to the capitalists prevailing in the market. Solving the system in v 0 F and v
1
F we obtain
The value of v 1 F can be found by substituting for the expression above into
The Final Good Sector
Final good Y is produced competitively according to to the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
where L Y denotes total labor employed in the …nal good sector, x j is the j th intermediate input, and A is the measure of varieties of these inputs. Competitive …rms solve the following maximization problem:
where p j is the price of the j th intermediate good, and where the …nal good is assumed as numeraire. From …rst-order conditions, we obtain p j = (x j =L Y ) 1 and 
The Intermediate Good Sector
Substituting for p j given from above and maximizing we obtain
We can also give an expression for the monopoly pro…ts as
Note that the symmetric structure of the economy makes quantities, prices and pro…ts independent of the speci…c variety produced. Thus it is
As a result, the aggregate production function can be written in the more familiar
Given that the functional distribution of income implies
substituting for w and given above, we obtain r = 2 Y K ;
implying that capital receives a smaller share of the average product of capital compared to the perfect competition case.
Consumption Decisions
Finally, consider the consumption decision of the representative household. Following the standard formalization, the problem is the one of maximizing an additively separable utility function, such as
(where c represents consumption per capita, C=L) under the usual dynamic budget
The time path of consumption per capita must obey the following Euler equation
4 The Balanced Growth Path
From now onwards we focus on the steady state. From the labor market clearing condition it must be that, along the balanced growth path,
Dividing the production function for ideas by
and taking logs and derivatives, we obtain that
that is to say, the rate of technological progress in this economy is equal to the growth rate of population. Given the expression of the aggregate production function (6), the growth rate of income per capita, y = Y =L, must also be equal to n (as usual in the class of "semi-endogenous" innovation-driven growth models).
From (7), and knowing that _ c=c = _ y=y = n, we can determine the (constant) value of r along the steady state, which is r = n ( + 1) + :
Working on (2), we derive that in steady state _ v
Knowing that all terms on the left-hand side are constant along the steady state, then it must be _ v
Since from (5) we know that the latter is equal to n, it must be _ v
Repeating exactly the same steps for v 0 F and v 1 F , we obtain
De…ning employment across the three activities in share values, that is, de…ning variables l i L i =L for i = Y; E; F , we can characterize the steady state equilibrium as the triple (l Y ; l E ; l F ) that solves the following system 8 > < > :
where the expressions for v 0 E ; v 0 F and w are respectively given in (9), (10) and (4). The …rst two equations of (11) state that, at equilibrium, the returns from being employed in the manufacturing sector must be equal to the expected returns from entrepreneurial as well as from capitalistic activities. Notice that, while w is a certain income, both v While the third equation of (11) represents the labor market-clearing condition, the …rst two equations can be interpreted as the implicit best response functions of, respectively, entrepreneurs to capitalists and of capitalists to entrepreneurs. It is easy to prove that both functions are positively-sloped (dl i =dl i > 0 for i = E; F ), thus signaling a strategic complementarity between the two main actors of the innovation process. The intuition for this complementarity goes as follows. In the …rst equation, capturing the e¤ect of capitalists on entrepreneurs, an increase in l F raises the probability of matching E for an entrepreneur, and thus it raises the expected returns from becoming entrepreneur, v 0 E . This induces a rise in the number of entrepreneurs. A totally symmetric reasoning applies to the second equation. 8 Using (9), (10), (4) and (5), and using the fact that _ A=A = n, E = _ A=L E , F = _ A=L F , we can rewrite system (11) as
While system (12) cannot be solved explicitly in the three unknowns l E ; l F ; l Y , the strategic complementarity between entrepreneurs and …nanciers indicates the theoretical possibility of multiple equilibria.
As usual in the class of innovation-driven growth models, the monopolistic rent associated with the new variety of intermediate good is totally extracted by the operators of the innovation sector. In a perfectly competitive market for entrepreneurial and capitalistic skills, the operators'contributions to the innovation process would be paid proportionally to their marginal productivities. From (1), the marginal productivities for entrepreneurs and capitalists can be written respectively as a (l F =l E ) 1 a and (1 a) (l E =l F ) a . This allocative rule then implies that the pro…t share ratio ( = 1 ) be equal to the marginal productivity ratio (a (l
that is, and simplifying where possible:
where superscript c refers to competition in the market for entrepreneurial and capitalistic skills. Expression (13) tells us that the pro…t shares accruing to entrepreneurs and …nanciers are governed by two forces: the relative elasticities of innovation to the inputs (a= (1 a)) and their relative number (l F =l E ). Solving (13) for c , we obtain 8 Cipollone and Giordani (2013) provide empirical evidence that support the existence of such complementarity in the business angel market. They also study the theoretical implications of this complementarity for the dynamics of the innovation process in a partial equilibrium framework.
As expected, the entrepreneurs' pro…t share responds positively to a and l F and negatively to l E (and, of course, viceversa for capitalists). 9 Although we cannot …nd the explicit values for the three unknowns l (12)), we can however prove their sub-optimality (see Section 5).
The Steady-State under Nash Bargaining of Monopoly Rents
In the classical economic literature on search and matching (as of Diamond, 1982 , Mortensen, 1982 , and Pissarides, 1984 , the general idea of a decentralized market is captured via a model where "potential traders are brought together pairwise by a given stochastic matching technology and, once together, their terms of trade are determined instantaneously as the outcome of a bargaining process that uses a given surplus-sharing rule" (Hosios, 1990 , p. 279). In the next subsection, and in line with the rest of the literature on entrepreneurial …nance cited in Section 2, we follow this tradition and combine search and matching with a bargaining process between the two actors of the innovation process over the distribution of monopoly rents. We do it because this is how both leading scholars in the …eld (Gompers and Lerner, 1999), as well practitioneers in the venture capital market, say this market works in practice:
an equity contract between the entrepreneur and the …nancier, where their respective share of future pro…ts re ‡ects their current bargaining power. 10 Now suppose that, when a successful matching occurs, the entrepreneur and the capitalist bargain over the pro…ts generated by that match, . In particular, suppose that the shares of these pro…ts are determined as a solution to a generalized Nash bargaining problem. When an entrepreneur and a capitalist meet, they negotiate over 9 Note that the strategic complementarity between entrepreneurs and capitalists highlighted above is here reinforced by the additional e¤ect passing through the (now endogenous) pro…t share, c : given (9) and (10), we can de…ne the surpluses as
F are interpreted as the threat points for, respectively, the entrepreneur and the capitalist.
The Nash bargaining problem is the one of maximizing the following expression with respect to :
where stands for the bargaining power of the entrepreneur. Taking the …rst order condition and simplifying, we obtain
Plugging the values for S E , S F written in (14) into the above expression and rearranging we obtain
Knowing that
where is the pro…t share of the entrepreneur prevalent in the market, and plugging these values into (15), we obtain = + (1 )
Finally, knowing that in equilibrium it must be = , we can solve for to obtain
where superscript b stands for bargaining.
Plugging the expression for b given above into system (12) and simplifying where possible, we …nally obtain 11;12
It is immediate to show that l 
Comparative Statics. Let us analyze the relationship between employment in the industry of ideas (l b E ; l b F ) and the main parameters of the model. First, it is immediate to prove that @l b i =@ < 0 (i = E; F ), that is, and rather reasonably, the higher the discount rate, the lower the amount of resources devoted to innovation. It is also @l b i =@ < 0 (i = E; F ): the lower the willingness to substitute consumption over time (the higher ), the lower the employment in the innovation sector. Both these e¤ects are standard in the class of horizontal innovation growth models. 11 In particular, we divide the …rst equation by ( E + 1 + n + ), and the second equation by
12 Here again, the fact that d b =dl F is strictly positive strengthens the strategic complementarity between entrepreneurs and capitalists that we have originally uncovered in system (12) .
It is also apparent that @l b i =@ < 0 (i = E; F ), meaning that a higher productivity of the innovation function shifts resources from the industry of ideas to the …nal good sector. This instead, is in contrast to this class of growth models, where the researchers' productivity does not a¤ect employment in the R&D sector (Jones, 1995b ).
Moreover, it is possible to prove that an increase in the entrepreneurs' bargaining power raises the number of entrepreneurs and lowers the number of capitalists:
13 On the other hand, it is @l
, that is to say, and in line with this class of growth models, the e¤ect of the growth rate on the industry of ideas is positive. 
The Role of the Policy Maker
In this section, we analyze the opportunity for the policy maker's intervention in the …nancial market of innovation. In particular, we …rst carry out the welfare analysis; we then compare the resulting optimal innovative e¤orts with the decentralized allocations obtained in Section 4. Finally, we identify the policy measure that induces the optimal total amount of resources devoted to innovation.
Welfare Analysis
The social planner problem can be expressed as
subject to the following constraints
where all variables of interest are expressed in per capita terms, that is, c = C=L, y = Y =L, k = K=L and, again, l i = L i =L for i = E; F; Y . This problem of dynamic optimization is fully worked out in Appendix A. The optimal allocation of employment is characterized by the following number of, respectively, entrepreneurs, …nanciers, and …nal good workers:
Dividing (20) by (21), we obtain the optimal ratio entrepreneurs/…nanciers as
We are now ready to compare the optimal innovative e¤orts to those obtained under a decentralized market.
Optimal vs. Decentralized Innovative E¤orts
Consider …rst the case without bargaining frictions, where entrepreneurs and …nanciers are paid according to their marginal productivities. If we impose the equality between the left-hand sides of the …rst two equations of (12), exploit (13) and simplify ( + n),
While this equation cannot be solved exactly for the equilibrium ratio entrepreneurs/…nanciers, it allows us to show easily that this ratio is di¤erent from the optimal ratio. In fact, an equilibrium ratio l c E =l c F is any …xed point of the function de…ned by the right-hand side of (23) . While this function is strictly increasing in l E =l F and may admit more than one …xed point, it is immediate to verify that a= (1 a) is not a …xed point of this function, and hence it is not a general solution to equation (23) .
Under Nash bargaining, the equilibrium ratio entrepreneurs/…nanciers is instead
, which again is di¤erent from the optimal ratio. Moreover, it is immediate to verify from (18) , (19) , (20) and (21) is strictly lower than the overall social bene…ts from the innovation (the consumer surplus), this external e¤ect induces too little innovative e¤ort.
The second source of market friction is instead related to the search process introduced via the production technology of new ideas (1) . Each entry in the innovation industry alters the research productivity of both entrepreneurs and capitalists. On the one hand, the entry of an entrepreneur (capitalist) lowers the productivity of all other entrepreneurs (capitalists). This negative e¤ect reminds us of the familiar stepping on toes e¤ect, and is due to the assumption of decreasing marginal productivity of both entrepreneurs and capitalists. This generates too much innovative e¤ort. On the other hand, to the extent that input factors are technological complements in (1), the entry of an entrepreneur raises the productivity of capitalists, and viceversa. In other words, the higher the number of capitalists, the higher the chance of a successful matching for an entrepreneur, and viceversa. This novel external e¤ect, that we could call easy matching e¤ect, is positive and induces too little e¤ort in the industry of ideas. 15 Finally, where a bargaining process is assumed to solve the pro…t sharing problem of the two innovative actors (Subsection 4.1), a third market friction characterizes the economy, which generates an equilibrium ratio entrepreneurs/…nanciers that re ‡ects their respective bargaining power ( ; 1 ), rather than their productivity in the innovation process (a; 1 a). In general, whether the economy devotes too few or too many total labor resources to innovation, and whether the distribution of these resources is tilted towards entrepreneurs or …nanciers, ultimately depends on the relative strength of all these external e¤ects characterizing the economy. 15 More formally, given that economic agents have zero measure in our economy, when making their occupational choice, they perceive their productivity as constant, that is:
, capturing the creativity of the marginal agent, is however equal to L
decreasing function of L i (stepping on toes e¤ect), and an increasing function of L i (easy matching e¤ect).
The Optimal Tax/Subsidy on Monopolistic Pro…ts
Given that we have found an explicit solution for both optimal and equilibrium innovative e¤orts under Nash Bargaining, it may be interesting to characterize explicitly the optimal innovation policy. The policy we consider in this section is one of tax/subsidy on the monopolistic pro…ts. Denote a pro…t subsidy rate (or tax rate if negative) by s 2 R. As a result, the new monopoly pro…ts can be written as (1 + s). Subsidies (taxes) are assumed to be withdrawn (transferred) from (to) the representative household, so that its intertemporal budget constraint remains una¤ected.
Ideally, the objective of the policy intervention would be the one of inducing the optimal shares of entrepreneurs and capitalists, l Along the steady state, the chance of a successful matching for either entrepreneurs or capitalists, as a function of the pro…t subsidy/tax, is worth respectively
Going through exactly the same steps followed in Subsection 4.1, we …nally obtain the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs and capitalists, again as a function of the pro…t subsidy/tax, as
To obtain the total equilibrium innovative e¤orts equal to the socially optimal ones, we must then solve equation
Exploiting the equilibrium expressions for l 
Implementing policyŝ, however, is not enough to obtain the …rst-best allocation of labor resources. As it appears from expressions (24) and (25), this policy measure does not alter the equilibrium ratio entrepreneurs/capitalists, l
which is di¤erent from the socially optimal ratio, a= (1 a). Ideally, the policy-maker would be called to an additional policy intervention to establish an institutional and legal system bringing as close as possible to a, that is, a system such that the bargaining power of entrepreneurs and capitalists re ‡ects their respective productivies in the innovation process. While a thorough analysis of such policy is out of the scope of this paper, we can however prove thatŝ is still the optimal subsidy/tax rate even when 6 = a. 17 In other words, it is still worth it (as a second-best policy) to induce a total amount of resources devoted to innovation equal to the socially optimal amount
, even when these resources are sub-optimally distributed according to the respective bargaining power of entrepreneurs and capitalists and not to their productivities.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has built a scale-free endogenous growth model with horizontal innovation.
An innovation is the outcome of a successful matching between an entrepreneur with a good idea and a capitalist recognizing the value of that idea. Incentives to become 16 To obtain the following expression, we have added and subtracted n 1 l (26) . 17 This statement can be easily proven exploiting the properties of system (27) either entrepreneurs or capitalists come from the possibility of sharing the monopoly pro…ts associated with any innovation. The model investigates the occupational choice of economic agents across the three possible activities they may undertake in this economy: entrepreneurial, capitalistic and manufacturing activities. The occupational equilibrium is de…ned as that con…guration for which the expected returns from the three activities are identical.
We have identi…ed the stationary equilibrium conditions of this economy. We have then investigated the characteristics of the equilibria and compared them to the optimal allocation. A dual role for the policy maker emerges from the analysis. On the one hand, the presence of search (and bargaining) frictions in the …nancial market of innovation calls for the policy maker's intervention to correct them and help restore optimality. On the other hand, in a world with multiple equilibria, where coordination failures between entrepreneurs and …nanciers are possible, public policy can in principle help the economy converge towards a better equilibrium.
In fact, the economy described above is potentially subject to a most disruptive coordination failure in the …nancial market of innovation, in which the labor resources devoted to innovation are null. This "no-growth trap" (as any other coordination failure) can easily be given a self-ful…lling interpretation. Innovators are willing to spend their intellectual resources to discover a new idea only if they have the chance to meet a …nancier. At the same time, …nanciers are willing to spend their intellectual resources to evaluate the pro…tability of ideas only if they have the chance to meet valuable innovators. Hence, a coordination failure is possible, in which pessimistic expectations may dissuade everybody from acting as either an entrepreneur or as a capitalist. As a result, the innovation process stops abruptly and the economy stagnates forever.
The possibility of coordination failures across economic agents may contribute to explain why the venture capital industry may fail to take o¤ even in potentially highly innovative economies. The lack of a favorable entrepreneurial climate may induce the innovative actors of the society to expect nobody involved in the innovation process.
Unfortunately, these pessimistic expectations may turn out to be self-ful…lling. In this respect, the role of the policy maker might be crucial in providing a coordination device towards a more innovative balanced growth path, thus liberating the entrepreneurial spirits of the economy.
A Welfare Analysis
This problem of dynamic optimization de…ned at the beginning of Section 5 presents three control variables, c (t) ; l F ; l E , and two state variables, k and A. The Hamiltonian writes as H (c; l E ; l F ; k; A) = c (t)
from which we obtain the following 5 conditions: 8 > > > > > > > > < > > > > > > > > :
y ly = 0
Working on H l E and H l F we immediately obtain that the optimal ratio entrepreneurs/…nanciers must be l E =l F = a= (1 a).
To …nd the absolute values of l E and l F we now proceed as follows. We know that in steady state it must be _ c=c = n. Taking logs and derivative from the …rst equation
in (27) , we then obtain _ k = k = n. On the other hand, dividiing H k by k and H A by A we obtain
where we have also exploited the expression for the production function y stated in one of the problem's constraints. Solving the …rst of the two equations in (28) by A=k and plugging it into the second, we obtain
Knowing that in steady state it is _ k = k = _ A = A = n, we can …nally solve the last equation for l Y in function of all parameters of the model and obtain (22) in the main text. Given that 1 = l E + l F + l Y , and that l E =l F = a= (1 a), it is easy to characterize the optimal number of entrepreneurs and …nanciers as given in, respectively, (20) and (21) .
